<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>YinkoShield Knowledge Center</title><description>Technical reference for execution evidence infrastructure — checkpoint architectures, mobile and POS runtime attack catalogues, evidence formats, dispute and audit workflow.</description><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/</link><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Cross-language conformance — four reference verifiers, identical output</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/cross-language-test-vectors/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/cross-language-test-vectors/</guid><description>Four reference verifiers across four runtimes share one corpus and produce identical verdicts. Cross-language conformance is the property; the corpus is gated.</description><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Audit, dispute, and evidence formats</category></item><item><title>Regulator-readable evidence — what is auditable, what stays operator-side</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/regulator-readable-format/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/regulator-readable-format/</guid><description>Public artefacts are sufficient for architectural pre-qualification. Full audit and dispute replay require the normative spec body and operator-held evidence.</description><pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Audit, dispute, and evidence formats</category></item><item><title>Dispute evidence workflow — chargeback investigator path</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/dispute-evidence-workflow/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/dispute-evidence-workflow/</guid><description>Dispute opens, operator queries the corpus by tctx, replays the signed sequence, presents three audience-scoped views — investigator, cardholder, regulator.</description><pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Audit, dispute, and evidence formats</category></item><item><title>Verifier pipeline — the eight-step contract</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/verification-pseudocode/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/verification-pseudocode/</guid><description>Eight stages, in order: parse, header, key, signature, chain, freshness, policy, emit. Contract is public; pseudocode bodies and failure enum sit in the spec.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Audit, dispute, and evidence formats</category></item><item><title>Evidence Token format — structural shape and the two profiles</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/evidence-token-format/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/audit-and-evidence-formats/evidence-token-format/</guid><description>JWS-compact ES256 wire shape with two profiles — Minimal for chain verification, Standard adds the signal payload. Field schema sits in the YEI-001 spec.</description><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Audit, dispute, and evidence formats</category></item><item><title>Signal / verdict separation — the substrate observes, the operator decides</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/signal-vs-verdict-separation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/signal-vs-verdict-separation/</guid><description>The substrate signs signals. The operator decides verdicts. One signal stream feeds many policy regimes — re-policed and re-played without re-signing.</description><pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Host-side correlation — composing signed evidence with operator pipelines</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/host-side-correlation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/host-side-correlation/</guid><description>EEI does not replace auth, fraud, AML, or dispute pipelines. It gives each of them a signed device-side column they did not have before.</description><pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Local key custody — device, operator, and vendor boundaries</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/local-key-custody/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/local-key-custody/</guid><description>The private key never leaves the device. The operator holds the public-key registry and verifier. YinkoShield holds none of it — by design, not promise.</description><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Self-signing devices — device-resident keypair semantics</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/self-signing-devices/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/self-signing-devices/</guid><description>ES256 keypair per device, hardware-backed where available. Non-exportable; signing makes records portable across operator and regulator without any vendor.</description><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Forward chaining — three independent invariants for drop, edit, replay</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/forward-chaining/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/forward-chaining/</guid><description>Three independent invariants — prev_hash, monotonic seq, single boot_id — surface drop, edit, reorder, and replay locally; no clock, no coordination.</description><pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Append-only hash-linked ledgers — structure and storage semantics</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/append-only-ledger-structure/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/evidence-architecture/append-only-ledger-structure/</guid><description>Append-only and hash-linked is a structural property. A local mutation of any record breaks an invariant the verifier checks without trusting the device.</description><pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Evidence architecture</category></item><item><title>Attestation drift across distributed terminal fleets</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/attestation-drift-distributed-fleets/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/attestation-drift-distributed-fleets/</guid><description>Per-device attestation answers per-device. At fleet scale, the question is about the distribution. Signed evidence makes the shape legible.</description><pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>POS, mPOS, and SST runtime threats</category></item><item><title>Kiosk-shell escape on Linux self-service terminals</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/sst-kiosk-escape/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/sst-kiosk-escape/</guid><description>A Linux SST runs the certified app inside a kiosk shell. Escape vectors are everything that crosses the enclosure — keyboard, USB, file dialog, recovery.</description><pubDate>Mon, 02 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>POS, mPOS, and SST runtime threats</category></item><item><title>OS downgrade attacks on payment terminals</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/os-downgrade-attacks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/os-downgrade-attacks/</guid><description>Rollback prevention is a counter compared against a fuse floor at boot. Downgrade attacks live where the floor check has bypass conditions in shipped fleets.</description><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>POS, mPOS, and SST runtime threats</category></item><item><title>Side-loaded applications on Android-based mPOS</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/mpos-side-loaded-apps/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/mpos-side-loaded-apps/</guid><description>An Android mPOS hosts the PCI MPoC payment app alongside everything else. Side-loaded APKs can attempt the full mobile-runtime attack catalogue.</description><pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>POS, mPOS, and SST runtime threats</category></item><item><title>POS terminal tampering — physical and firmware attack surface</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/pos-tampering/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/pos-runtime-threats/pos-tampering/</guid><description>PCI PTS draws an envelope around the terminal&apos;s secure cryptographic processor. Two attack surfaces test it: physical penetration and firmware-flash.</description><pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>POS, mPOS, and SST runtime threats</category></item><item><title>Runtime memory manipulation — process-memory rewriting</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/runtime-memory-manipulation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/runtime-memory-manipulation/</guid><description>Two paths rewrite a process&apos;s .text segment: /proc/[pid]/mem direct write, or mprotect-then-memcpy. The signal is in-memory hash drift.</description><pubDate>Thu, 12 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Magisk and Zygisk — rootkit-class module abuse</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/magisk-zygisk-modules/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/magisk-zygisk-modules/</guid><description>Zygisk modules load inside the zygote before fork. The target app&apos;s first line of code runs with the modules already mapped into its address space.</description><pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Debugger attachment and runtime introspection</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/debugger-attachment/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/debugger-attachment/</guid><description>On Android, /proc/[pid]/status&apos;s TracerPid reveals an attached debugger. On iOS, kp_proc.p_flag&apos;s P_TRACED is the equivalent.</description><pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Hook-detection bypass and counter-detection</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/hook-detection-bypass/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/hook-detection-bypass/</guid><description>Each detection rung — maps scan, syscall scan, prologue-hash, remote attestation — has documented counter-techniques. The substrate signs what was observed.</description><pubDate>Sun, 01 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Root cloaking — hiding root state from in-app checks</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/root-cloaking/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/root-cloaking/</guid><description>Magisk DenyList defeats heuristic probes. It does not defeat hardware-backed attestation, which reads the chip&apos;s RootOfTrust directly.</description><pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Library injection via Frida and Xposed</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/library-injection-frida-xposed/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/library-injection-frida-xposed/</guid><description>Frida and Xposed inject agent libraries into the target process — visible in /proc/[pid]/maps as an unexpected .so mapped from a non-app path.</description><pubDate>Sun, 25 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Screen-capture attacks — MediaProjection abuse</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/screen-capture-attacks/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/screen-capture-attacks/</guid><description>Once the user grants a MediaProjection session, the token persists. Capture can run across foreground transitions until the host calls stop().</description><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Run-as trust model — debuggable targets, SELinux scope, and the run-as defect class</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/run-as-exploit/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/run-as-exploit/</guid><description>Android&apos;s run-as is scoped to debuggable targets and trusted callers. The trust model, the defect class (CVE-2024-0044 et al.), and what the substrate observes.</description><pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Snapshot timing — exploiting visible state during background transition</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/snapshot-timing-exploits/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/snapshot-timing-exploits/</guid><description>The platform takes a snapshot of the activity for the recents thumbnail at the background transition. Without FLAG_SECURE, sensitive frames are captured.</description><pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Malicious input-method editor (IME) compromise</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/malicious-ime/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/malicious-ime/</guid><description>Every keystroke flows through the active IME. A compromised IME has read access to every character and write access to the host app&apos;s input field.</description><pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Accessibility service abuse — automated UI scraping and input synthesis</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/accessibility-service-abuse/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/accessibility-service-abuse/</guid><description>BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE grants reads of every running app&apos;s UI tree and writes via synthesised gestures. A single user toggle, no per-use prompt.</description><pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Transaction parameter tampering — modifying values between confirm and submit</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/transaction-parameter-tampering/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/transaction-parameter-tampering/</guid><description>The user confirms one set of values; an attacker process rewrites the payload between confirm and submit; the backend receives different values.</description><pubDate>Mon, 22 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Overlay injection — system-overlay UI manipulation on Android</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/overlay-injection/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/overlay-injection/</guid><description>A malicious window registers as TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY above the legitimate activity. User input goes to the overlay; the host app receives nothing.</description><pubDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item><item><title>Hardware-backed attestation chains — Keystore, Knox, StrongBox, Secure Enclave</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/hardware-attestation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/hardware-attestation/</guid><description>Hardware attestation is an X.509 chain rooted in a vendor CA. It proves where a key was generated — not what the runtime did with it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>Behavioural biometrics — observation scope and accuracy bounds</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/behavioural-biometrics/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/behavioural-biometrics/</guid><description>A four-stage pipeline producing a session-scoped score against a per-user baseline. NIST and EBA treat it as a continuous risk signal, not an authenticator.</description><pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>SafetyNet&apos;s deprecation and the migration to Play Integrity</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/safetynet-legacy/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/safetynet-legacy/</guid><description>SafetyNet Attestation: announced June 2022, onboarding cutoff Jan 2023, shut down Jan 2025. Play Integrity is the successor — same shape, refined verdicts.</description><pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>FIDO2 and passkeys — what the assertion does and does not prove</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/fido2-and-passkeys/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/fido2-and-passkeys/</guid><description>WebAuthn signs a server challenge bound to rpId and origin — phishing-resistant by construction. The transaction body is not part of the default assertion.</description><pubDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>EMV credential authentication and EMV 3DS device-data scope</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/emv-and-emv-3ds/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/emv-and-emv-3ds/</guid><description>EMV proves credential authenticity at the rail. EMV 3DS 2.x adds a structured device-environment snapshot at authentication initiation.</description><pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>Apple App Attest and DeviceCheck — the attestation/assertion split</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/app-attest-and-device-check/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/app-attest-and-device-check/</guid><description>App Attest is a two-step model: attestation binds an app-instance key once; assertions sign each call. DeviceCheck is a separate per-device flag service.</description><pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>Play Integrity verdict semantics</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/play-integrity/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/checkpoint-architectures/play-integrity/</guid><description>What MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY, MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, and MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITY mean. Verdict freshness, quota, deprecation history, and operator policy.</description><pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Checkpoint architectures</category></item><item><title>PSD2 SCA challenge completion versus settlement message generation</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-sca-settlement-gap/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-sca-settlement-gap/</guid><description>PSD2 RTS specifies the authentication code and its dynamic linking. The runtime interval between SCA completion and settlement is operator-defined.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>The Unobserved Interval</category></item><item><title>Behavioural-biometrics session windows and transaction boundaries</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-behavioural-session-gap/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-behavioural-session-gap/</guid><description>Behavioural scores compute over a session window. The transaction event may sit inside or outside it — the score does not bind to the transaction.</description><pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>The Unobserved Interval</category></item><item><title>EMV credential generation versus device-side execution</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-emv-execution-gap/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-emv-execution-gap/</guid><description>EMV signs the credential at the rail. The device-side flow that produced the inputs — PAN entry, amount, consent — sits before the signed boundary.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>The Unobserved Interval</category></item><item><title>FIDO2 assertion versus transaction submission</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-fido2-submission-gap/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-fido2-submission-gap/</guid><description>The WebAuthn assertion signs the challenge, not the transaction body. The interval to settlement is where the body is assembled, confirmed, and submitted.</description><pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>The Unobserved Interval</category></item><item><title>Play Integrity verdict freshness and the inter-call gap</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-play-integrity-gap/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/the-unobserved-interval/the-play-integrity-gap/</guid><description>Play Integrity verdicts have a freshness window. Between successive calls, the device&apos;s runtime trajectory is unobserved by Play Integrity itself.</description><pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>The Unobserved Interval</category></item><item><title>How advanced malware from Asia is targeting Africa&apos;s financial sector</title><link>https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/malware-asia-africa/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.yinkoshield.com/knowledge-center/mobile-runtime-attacks/malware-asia-africa/</guid><description>A 2024–2025 wave of overlay attacks, accessibility-service abuse, GoldFactory tooling, and device-takeover fraud across African mobile banking.</description><pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>Mobile runtime attacks</category></item></channel></rss>